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ABSTRACT 
This work is a philosophical exploration of ethical decision-making.  Bernard Lonergan’s 
transcendental method can be applied to how environmental decision-makers might 
develop normative foundations for ethical decision-making, including the role of religion 
in ethical deliberation.  In this thesis, I explore the notions of ‘value’ and ‘self-realization’ 
as developed in the method of Arne Naess’ deep, long-range ecology; these notions have 
an implicit religious meaning.  While Naess was at pains to avoid a repeat of the errors of 
the Western Judeo-Christian bifurcation of matter and spirit, his deep ecology is 
underlined by an implicitly religious foundation.  The normative method for deep ecology 
offers a solution to how we might move from the present question of “How did we get 
here” to “Where do we go from here?” by intending self-realization.  Achieving self-
realization allows human beings to proceed into the future through beautiful action and 
knowledge of what is truly good and concrete. 
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1 
PREFACE 
 
Scholars have dedicated their lives to interpreting the works of both Naess and Lonergan; 
the aim of this thesis, however, is to provide a very brief overview of their methods, 
which will allow me to highlight precisely why I believe Naess’ deep ecology movement 
to be fundamentally religious.   
The ultimate goal of Lonergan’s transcendental method is to achieve self-
transcendence; similarly, Naess’ method aims toward what he calls self-realization.  To 
achieve either is to experience a total conversion of the self.  To understand this 
conversion as a religious one is not only important in that we may be able to deepen our 
interpretation of what religion is, but utilizing their methods offers us an opportunity to 
reach toward the good life toward an understanding of what is concretely true and good.  I 
should note that this project is not meant to be prescriptive, but rather offer a glimpse into 
the methods that drive their philosophies. 
  
2 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
Environmental ethicists face the challenge of organizing data and methods from a 
complex set of interdisciplinary fields.  Ethical deliberation aims towards the generation 
of informed decisions that collectively improve our communities, our environment, and 
our selves.  As a personal and collective guideline for decision-making, including small-
scale and large-scale policy, the process of ethical deliberation is concerned with 
understanding our situation – the question, “How did we get here?” – and based on our 
analysis, determining an answer to the question, “Where do we go from here?”  
Ethics as a formal study, however, adds to specific ethical deliberations an 
understanding of the good as a general feature of human living.  Its job is to develop a 
heuristic framework for all human deliberation, including consideration of environmental 
issues in all their complexity.  Naturally, ethics in principle includes the area of religion, 
which addresses questions of ultimate meaning; answers to such questions are 
unsurprisingly relevant in human deliberations.1  
Given the scope of this project, the focus draws primarily from ‘western’ concepts 
of ethics and environment.  Western religious, political, and economic worldviews have 
had the primary influence on globalization; many rights movements began in the West 
and of those that did not, many were largely influenced by the West.  The notion of 
‘value’ itself is paramount within Occidental ethical discourse, though, of course, the 
West has no monopoly on ‘values.’  We cannot ignore the importance of Western 
                                                          
1 See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1971, 101-103. 
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traditions when considering contemporary environmental ethics.  However, limiting this 
study of the religious foundations of an environmental movement to a study of Western 
thinkers does not in principle invalidate its relevance to developing a global foundation 
for ethics.  While the diversity of human meaning is well documented, it remains that we 
live on one globe and that Homo sapiens is self-evidently a species with defining 
characteristics. Insofar as Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess points toward a global 
perspective in his foundations for deep ecology, it is important to consider what elements 
of his thought, and especially his method for ecological decision-making, might be 
relevant to both a philosophical understanding of our place in this world and in 
developing policies and strategies about how to proceed into the future.  Likewise, 
Lonergan’s work is self-consciously universal in scope.  Broadly speaking, then, I intend 
to explore how environmental decision-makers might go about developing a foundation 
for ethical decision-making and to consider the role of religion in such decisions.  
Specifically, I am interested in exploring the notions of ‘value’ and ‘self-realization’ as 
developed in Arne Naess’ deep, long-range ecology.  
To move toward an answer to the questions of how we got here and where we are 
to go next, Naess argues that we must experience a shift in value, and more importantly, a 
degree of self-realization.  As we shall explore later, a ‘shift in values’ and ‘self-
realization’ have implicitly religious meanings.  To tackle such questions in a way that 
will lead us to an understanding of value and what is good and true, we must employ a 
method that is specific to questions such as these.  Bernard Lonergan’s transcendental 
method is one such method; it is practical, concise, and accessible to all humans, and, as I 
will argue, is in fundamental ways complementary to Naess’ own normative method for 
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decision-making.  The tenets of deep ecology contend that it is the change in perception 
of self (i.e. self-realization), reached through engagement with and understanding of the 
natural world that removes otherness and provides a solid platform for all subsequent 
ethics related to the environment.  Lonergan, for his part, speaks of intellectual, moral, 
and religious conversions.2   
 
A Problem: What is Other? 
Timothy Morton, a professor of Literature and the Environment, suggests that the 
“environment was born at exactly the moment when it became a problem;” within “a 
society that fully acknowledged that we were always already involved in our world, there 
would be no need to point it out.”3  For Morton, the acknowledgement of terms like 
‘environment’ and ‘ecology’ suggests that we are in conflict with something that is apart 
from us.  Even with an acknowledgement of the ecological problems we are facing, 
nature continues to be understood as something other.4  On the one hand, we manipulate 
nature to exploit its potential to improve our standard of living.  On the other hand, and 
equally deserving of attention, we recognize the importance of preserving nature.  
However, for environmental activist William Ashworth, the natural world cannot be 
completely civilized, nor can it be simply preserved by the hand of man.  He writes: 
                                                          
2 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, 130-131. “By conversion is understood a transformation of the 
subject and his [sic] world…” 
3 Timothy Morton, Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 141. 
4 In the context of the history of human rights discourse in the West, we are now more accepting of 
diversity, whether we are speaking of ethnicity and gender, or class and sexual identification.  Yet at the 
same time we seem to be perplexed about our place in the universe. We are by no means in a state of 
harmony with each other or with the environment. As Levinas so poignantly expressed it, there has always 
been an other. 
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“Nature,” as we conceive of it, in fact does not exist; all that exists is the universe… and 
we are a part of it, affecting everything we touch and either flourishing or withering by 
the result – as does all life.”5  His point is that we, just like any other creature, are bound 
by natural law, an oft-forgotten fact in the West.6  To ignore it is to invite disaster.  
 Ethicists have made many efforts to address this situation.  For example, animal 
rights activist Peter Singer holds that we typically treat animals, and by extension the 
environment, as an undeserving other.  In this context, we cannot identify the 
environment as part of who we are.  This is not so far from what human rights advocates 
would argue, as no human being deserves to be treated with any degree of disrespect or 
cruelty.  Singer takes this idea one step further to argue that all animals, including the 
human animal, are equal.  He does not deny that human beings are unique in their 
abilities.  Nevertheless, for him, this fact is irrelevant to his position.  It is what all 
animals have in common, especially the capacity to suffer, which is of primary 
importance.  It is the racist, the misogynist, the speciesist who ignores the similarities 
between himself and the other, and according to Singer, most human beings are 
speciesist. 
 How then, do we come to decide what is most important or most worthwhile when 
dealing with issues that affect more than our own immediate self-interests?  Any effective 
ethical deliberation must consider all relevant data in all the relevant fields, for as Jesuit 
priest, philosopher, and theologian Bernard Lonergan famously wrote: “What is good 
                                                          
5 William Ashworth, The Left Hand of Eden (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1999), xi. 
6 Ashworth, The Left Hand of Eden, xii. 
6 
always is concrete.”7  Environmental issues, especially when life is involved, and life is 
always involved, are, therefore, complicated.  They can engage all the sciences, both 
social and human, the humanities, and applied fields of study.  But to what do we attend 
first?  Is it human rights, animal rights, or the rights of the environment, the biosphere, the 
ecosphere?  How are the various claims handled?  Both human rights and animal rights 
are intimately connected to the decisions we make about the environment.  The field of 
environmental ethics, defined as “the systematic and critical study of the moral judgments 
and attitudes which (consciously or unconsciously) guide human beings in the way they 
behave towards nature,”8 calls us to gather the data we need to make important decisions 
concerning the well-being of ourselves and our surroundings.   
The dilemma points towards a set of underlying foundational questions that are 
philosophical and, ultimately, religious.  What is it to be human?  What is our place in the 
cosmos?  In light of such questions about our ultimate meaning, where we begin and how 
we proceed forward in our quest for answers is important.  
The Christian tradition, ranging from religious belief about the nature of human 
beings and their relation to the environment to the Protestant work ethic beginning with 
the Reformation, to a great extent molded modernity and the shift to globalization.  With 
the ever-increasing reach of the Western tradition, there is a growing emphasis on 
democracy, individualism, a scientific ethos of technological innovation, and global 
economic integration.  The dominant tenet of Western humanism values individual 
                                                          
7 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 27. 
8 Mikael Stenmark, Environmental Ethics and Policy Making (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2002), 15. 
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freedom, which deeply influences governmental decision-making on both the economy 
and environment.  Rapid economic development, especially in the West, plays a 
significant role in worsening our contemporary environmental situation.  We are 
beginning to realize the importance of facing responsibly the environmental crisis, for our 
very survival may be at stake.  Ironically, many environmental ethics movements that 
have emerged in response to the crisis have largely operated within the same utilitarian 
mindset that led us into crisis.  They continue to implicitly support those values of 
Western modernity that have been problematic from the start.  
 There is no question that religion has had a major influence in defining ecological 
cosmology and Western philosophies.  Even when religious questions and realities are 
rejected, the culture addressed grew out of a religious context.  It follows that we might 
justifiably identify religion as a primary cause for stress on this planet.9  For this reason, 
Lynn White’s 1967 article “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis”10 has been 
rather significant in many discussions regarding the relation between religion and 
ecology.  White echoed criticisms of the institution of religion made by 18th century 
philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who believed that Western religion “[distorts] 
human societies into forms that detract from the freedom and well-being of all natural 
beings.”11  White identifies Christianity as the primary tradition that has led the world 
                                                          
9 Wars, for example, have begun in the name of religion, inevitably leading to environmental 
degradation.  (However, although it is true that wars may begin in the name of religion, we can question 
whether the primary causes of ‘religious wars’ are inherent in the core values of religion itself.  While the 
question is complex and beyond the scope of this thesis, I would simple note that it is difficult to reconcile 
core precepts such as those found in the Christian Beatitudes or the Buddhist Eightfold Path with a call to 
religious war.) 
10 Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155, no. 3767 (1967). 
11 Bron Taylor, Dark Green Religion: Nature Spirituality and the Planetary Future (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010), 10. 
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into scientific, technological, political, and environmental decline, and in effect identifies 
the Christian tradition as a significant source for the justification of environmental 
degradation.  He writes: “Christianity inherited from Judaism not only a concept of time 
as non-repetitive and linear but also a striking story of creation,”12  Thus, for White, the 
first blessing, Genesis 1:27-28,  is the starting point for understanding the historical and 
contemporary treatment of the environment.  “So God created mankind in his own image, 
in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. God blessed them 
and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it.  Rule 
over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that moves 
on the ground’ (NIV translation).”  White concludes from this that the world has never 
seen a more anthropocentric religion.  In his view, Christianity appears to see little or “no 
relationship between the spiritual and the physical orders of [being, and throughout 
history] it has devalued the flesh and the world as inferior to the concerns of the soul.”13  
Such assumptions of a quasi-god-like nature creates a split between man and environment 
that allows human beings to exploit the planet without regard to the integrity of nature.  
Non-human life holds no value in and of itself.  Conversely, nature is but a tool that man 
might use for survival and enjoyment. 
White’s biblical scholarship has been heavily criticized, as has his brief, simple, 
incomplete, and almost farcical description of Western history.  However, White does 
highlight concerns that remain relevant today, namely that the “history of ecological 
                                                          
12 White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” 1205. 
13 Mark I. Wallace, “Sacred-Land Theology: Green Spirit, Deconstruction, and the Question of Idolatry 
in Contemporary Earthen Christianity” in Ecospirit: Religions and Philosophies for the Earth, ed. Laurel 
Kearns and Catherine Keller (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 292. 
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change is still so rudimentary that we know little about what really happened, or what the 
results were.”14  Yet while his biblical scholarship may be suspect, he is not wrong in 
pointing out the intersection between the current environmental crisis and the 
development of Western civilization, a civilization rooted in the religions of the Book.  In 
any case, as Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim argue: 
While the particulars of [White’s] argument have been vehemently 
debated, it is increasingly clear that the environmental crisis... present[s] a 
serious challenge to the world’s religions.  This is especially true because 
many of these religions have been concerned with the path of personal 
salvation, which frequently emphasized otherworldly goals and rejected 
this world as corrupting.  Thus, how to adapt religious teaching to this task 
of revaluing nature so as to prevent its destruction marks a significant new 
phase in religious thought.15 
 
As Western scientific and technological advances developed from Christian 
attitudes regarding the man-nature dualism, it is doubtful for White “that disastrous 
ecologic backlash can be avoided simply by applying to our problems more science and 
more technology.”16  As White suggests, humankind does see itself as somehow unique 
and apart from the natural process, and evidence suggests that religious beliefs do often 
support the notion of our mastery over nature.   
Is there another way of understanding our relationship with nature that grasps 
value and merit in preserving nature apart from our own benefit?  According to the 
commonly held veni, vidi, vici mindset, the answer is no.  Human beings are reasonable 
creatures, or rather endowed with the faculty of reason, and are thus conceived as unique.  
                                                          
14 White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” 1203. 
15Mary E. Tucker and John Grim, “Series Forward,” in Christianity and Ecology. Ed. Dieter Hessel and 
Rosemary Ruether (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), xxv. 
16 White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” 1206. 
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Within this horizon, the human species is an alienated species, one that values an 
ecological cosmology defined through a tyrannical mentality.  Similarly, when addressing 
matters of natural law and process, we tend to do so in a way that suggests nature is 
somehow purposefully either serving or negatively affecting humankind.  Ashworth 
argues that when speaking of natural processes, we commonly use language of 
destruction and violence.17  Such anthropomorphism and hyperbole further separate 
human beings from such natural force, providing more reason to try to subdue it. 
As is often the case, our concern for the environment originates from a concern 
for our own well-being.  We are driven by the desire to thrive, which many would argue 
is an instinctual motivation.  Conversely, many would argue that we have broken the 
shackles of instinctual restraint and that our reason and ability to learn makes us 
genuinely unique.  This distinctive characteristic separates us from the non-human 
animal, and for many, offers justification to override the interests of those who do not 
possess the same mental ‘worth.’  Such self-understandings inevitably shape our moral 
understanding of our world.  Materialists do not consider anything beyond what is visible.  
For them the spiritual does not exist.  Alternatively, the Platonic tradition, which seems to 
separate the spiritual and the material and has been so influential in Christian theology, 
serves as a constant affirmation of the death of animism and nature-based religious 
traditions.  In this view, Christianity looks beyond what is visible toward a spiritual other 
– our ‘true’ nature.  For White, while the source of our problems is so rooted in what he 
regards as Christian religious arrogance, nonetheless, our response must essentially be 
                                                          
17 Ashworth, The Left Hand of Eden, 35. 
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religious as well.  We must find a way to rethink what seems to us an age-old 
cosmological identity.   
 
Lonergan and Naess: Value Shift, Self-Realization, and Deep Ecology 
Lynn White proposes that an ideological shift is necessary, but he does not suggest how 
this is to be done.  In response to White’s article, Willis Jenkins argues that by “focusing 
discussion of religious environmentalism on ecological cosmology, collaborative 
exchanges can not only accommodate great religious, political, and methodological 
diversity, but also refer to shared criteria of interest.”18  For thinkers like Arne Naess, this 
is an excellent approach to the problem.  However, to experience a shift away from 
beliefs so deeply rooted in our culture, we must reconsider our understanding of value 
and the good.  Value, for both Naess and Lonergan, is a transcendental notion.  According 
to Lonergan, our self-realization (identified in his works as self-transcendence) results 
from an exploration of conscious intentionality that consists of many parts and requires a 
lengthy personal (and ultimately communal) development: 
There is a first step in attending to the data of sense and of consciousness 
[i.e., experience].  Next, inquiry and understanding yield an apprehension of 
a hypothetical world mediated by meaning.  Thirdly, reflection and 
judgment reach an absolute: through them we acknowledge what really is 
so, what is independent of us and our thinking.  Fourthly, by deliberation, 
evaluation, decision, action, we can know and do, not just what pleases us, 
but what truly is good, worthwhile.  Then we can be principles of 
benevolence and beneficence, capable of genuine collaboration and of true 
love.  But it is one thing to do this occasionally, by fits and starts.  It is 
another to do it regularly, easily, spontaneously.  It is, finally, only by 
reaching the sustained self-transcendence [self-realization] of the virtuous 
                                                          
18 Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2008), 10. 
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man that one becomes a good judge, not on this or that human act, but on 
the whole range of human goodness.19 
 
Value for Lonergan is not only a transcendental notion and achievement, but a 
concrete reality.20  His transcendental method is accessible to each of us insofar as we are 
being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible; it is “a normative pattern of 
recurrent and related operations [of questions, answers, and actions,] yielding cumulative 
results.”21 
Naess, for his part, believes that how man came into this world often determines 
how he identifies with his surroundings.  Man, as a mobile being, has struggled with such 
questions for millennia, and Naess approaches these questions following a series of 
points:   
1. We underestimate ourselves, confusing the “self” with ego. 
2. With the comprehensive maturation in all relationships, our human 
nature leads us to identify with all living beings. 
3. Maturity of the self has traditionally been understood to develop 
through three specific stages: from ego to social self (encompassing the 
ego) to metaphysical self (encompassing the social self). However, 
nature is fundamentally left out here.  “Our immediate 
environment…and the identification with nonhuman living beings are 
largely ignored.”  Therefore, Naess introduces the concept of the 
ecological self. “We may be said to be in, and of, nature from the very 
                                                          
19 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 35. 
20 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 36. 
21 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 4. 
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beginning of ourselves. Society and human relationships are important, 
but our own self is much richer in its constitutive relationships,” which 
comprise those we have with other humans, as well as non-humans.  
4. The experience of living is bettered through self-realization, (i.e., the 
fulfillment of our potentials), as an increase in self-realization “implies 
a broadening and deepening of the self.”  
5. The self is deepened through the inevitable identification we have with 
other beings and our increased maturity.  “Our self-realization is 
hindered if the self-realization of others, with whom we identify, is 
hindered. Our self-love will fight this hindrance by assisting in the self-
realization of others according to the formula ‘Live and let live!’ Thus, 
everything that can be achieved by altruism— the dutiful, moral 
consideration for others— can be achieved, and much more, by the 
process of widening and deepening ourselves.” 
6. The ecological devastation that we face today violates humanity’s 
enlightened self-interest, as well as that of nonhuman beings, and limits 
the joy of existence in general.22 
For Naess, coming to know who we are individually is an existential experience.  
It is a consent to unrestricted love.  “We need environmental ethics,” argues Naess, “but 
when people feel that they unselfishly give up, or even sacrifice, their self-interests to 
show love for nature, this is probably, in the long run, a treacherous basis for 
                                                          
22 Arne Naess, The Ecology of Wisdom, ed. Alan Drengson and Bill Devall (Berkeley: Counterpoint 
Press, 2008), 81-82. 
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conservation.”23  It is through identification that one will successfully see his interests 
being served by conservation, through the love of a transcended, deepened self, and the 
realization of the inherent potentialities of the other.  Questions such as, “What are the 
inherent potentialities of the beings of species x?” lead us to answers, which in turn lead 
us to more questions regarding, for instance, our own inherent potentialities as a species. 
This line of reasoning will eventually lead us to move beyond that which we previously 
were, becoming what Naess refers to as our ecological selves: 
Through the wider Self, every living being is connected intimately, and 
from this intimacy follows the capacity of identification and, as its natural 
consequences, practice of nonviolence.  No moralizing is needed, just as 
we do not need morals to breathe.  We need to cultivate our insight: The 
rock-bottom foundation of the technique for achieving the power of non-
violence is belief in the essential oneness of all life.24 
Naess’ deep ecology movement embodies this notion.  The platform for deep ecology can 
be both rooted in and derived from the fundamentals of religion, philosophy, as well as 
ethics.  However, it is necessary to avoid identifying deep ecology with any one specific 
philosophy or religious belief.  It is intended to be broad and transcultural, encouraging 
religious diversity.  Naess states that “there is a rich manifold of fundamental views 
compatible with the deep ecology platform.  And without this, the movement would lose 
its transcultural character.”25  Naess’ platform for deep ecology reveals this transcultural 
character.  For supporters of the movement, the principles of the platform can be rooted in 
any religion or philosophy.  The platform is founded on eight points, outlined as follows: 
23 Naess, The Ecology of Wisdom, 85. 
24 Naess, The Ecology of Wisdom, 90. 
25 Ibid. 
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1. The flourishing of all life has intrinsic value, and the value of non-
human life is independent of its apparent “usefulness” to man.
2. The richness and diversity of all life forms are also values in themselves
and contribute to the flourishing of all other life.
3. Man does not have the right to reduce this richness and diversity apart
from satisfying his vital needs.
4. A decrease in the human population can lead to a flourishing of both
human and non-human life.
5. The interference of human beings on the non-human world is excessive,
and is rapidly getting worse.
6. It follows that policies regarding the environment must be changed.
These changes would affect our basic economic, technological, and
ideological structures, and the result would lead to the possibility of a
more fulfilling experience of the connectedness and interdependence of
all life.
7. “The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality
(dwelling in situations of [intrinsic] value) rather than adhering to an
increasingly higher standard of living.  There will be profound
awareness of the difference between ‘big’ and ‘great.’”
8. Those people who adhere to the above seven points have an obligation
to contribute in the challenge to execute the necessary changes.26
26 Naess, The Ecology of Wisdom, 111. 
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Within deep ecology there is an attempt to avoid ascribing to nature an 
instrumental value; instead, Naess understands value as both internal and entirely 
objective in character.  Currently, the dominant Western worldview is contrary to sound 
environmental ethics.  Liberalist democracy has given rise to unrestrained capitalism and 
resulted in astonishing stress on the environment.  The belief that the world is the human 
dominion in which we will do what we please is troublesome.  Nevertheless, human 
beings are ontologically connected to the natural world, no matter how estranged we seem 
to have become.  Technological progress is not an indication that we have somehow 
surpassed, defeated, or disconnected from nature.  On the contrary, it is a way in which 
we might reaffirm our natural condition.  Our ‘progress’ in the fields of technology 
especially, and the increasing demand for raw materials, have driven us into a crisis.  To 
confirm that there is a problem, an affirmation of certain instability, has always been the 
first step in a new understanding of what it means to be of moral worth. 
Arne Naess introduced with his version of deep ecology a normative method akin 
to that which is used in the sciences.  Like Naess’ approach, Lonergan’s heuristic 
transcendental method is normative, producing cumulative results.  Both methods intend 
the same objective – self-realization.  Unlike Lonergan, who was a religious man, Naess 
rejects the notion that deep ecology is grounded in religious philosophy.  While he would 
acknowledge that religious philosophy and tradition are not contrary to the principles of 
deep ecology, they do not define the movement.  However, it is important for us to 
expand notions such as self-transcendence and self-realization to incorporate the religious 
zone of experience and inquiry.  Lonergan defines self-transcendence as “the achievement 
of conscious intentionality” and that self-transcendence explicitly includes a religious 
17 
intentionality. 27  For Naess, self-realization in one’s conscious intentionality is to reach 
one’s ecological self, which I suggest and hope to show shares important elements with a 
deeper understanding of religion and religious or ultimate values.  Lonergan states that 
“as [conscious intentionality] has many parts and a long development, so too has [self-
transcendence].”  This thesis sets out to identify the role of religion and spirituality in two 
specific methods, tools used to achieve self-realization in both Naess’ deep ecology and 
Lonergan’s method in theology.  Deep ecology, which aims to discover our place in the 
cosmos, to identify the interconnectedness of all things, and to make good, concrete 
decisions about how we are to proceed into the future, is, I believe, at its very core, a 
religious movement. 
27 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 35. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Debate About Value in Environmental Ethics 
 
As we said at the beginning, “ethical deliberation aims towards the generation of 
informed decisions for the betterment of our communities, our environment, and our 
selves.”   
Values motivate what we are going to do or not do; they inform the process of 
whether we choose one course of action rather than another.  Moreover, as thoughtful 
creatures, each one of us has some understanding, however minimal, of our ‘place’ in the 
world; that is, we have some notion of how we each share a common world.  In this 
context, we observe, we learn, we make decisions, and at significant moments we may 
revisit and reevaluate the horizon of our world and our relationship to it.  How we 
understand our place in the universe, our horizon of concern or care, provides the 
boundary zone for what we consider importance to us – that is to say, what is of real 
value.  As suggested in Chapter One, that identity is at least implicitly religious.  In other 
words, we all hold some type of cosmological identity, whether we know it or not.  
To engage in thorough, effective, and concrete ethical deliberation, within the 
context of the work of both Naess and Lonergan, it is important to understand how for 
both there is a normative dynamic imbedded in the notion of value.28  In the next chapters 
we will explore in more detail the normative features of the notion of value as presented 
                                                          
28 Many might dismiss a conversation about the meaning of “value” as irrelevant, but I would argue that 
philosophy plays the greatest role in understanding notions such as these, since ethics, though 
interdisciplinary, finds its fundamental roots in philosophy. 
19 
by Naess and Lonergan.29  For now we need only point out that for Arne Naess, a 
normative notion of value plays a central role in the construction of his apron diagram.30  
Lonergan, for his part, presents a generalized method in which value “is what is intended 
in [all] questions for deliberation.”?31  Both Lonergan’s transcendental method and Naess 
eight-point platform aim at a fundamental and profoundly personal shift in perspective, a 
change in the boundaries of our ‘world.’  Naess’ shift embodied by a normative trans-
valuation of the notion of value – a deep ecology – is embedded in a very practical and 
concrete strategy of realigning our personal relationship with earth.  Lonergan’s shift is 
more general: it is a shift in method that illuminates a personal development involving 
intellectual, moral, and religious conversions.  To begin to appreciate the significance of 
the contribution of both, we first turn in this chapter to a brief historical sketch of 
conflicting approaches to environmental ethics that have informed the debate.  This 
should help to contextualize and sharpen our appreciation of the shifts envisaged by 
Naess and Lonergan to be taken up in chapters three and four. 
 
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value 
Environmental ethicists typically employ the distinction between extrinsic value and 
intrinsic value.  On the one hand, something possesses intrinsic value, because it is 
valuable in and of itself.  It is non-relational (i.e., value-independent of its relationship 
with other things), non-derivative (i.e., not valuable because of other things), and it is 
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objective and concrete (i.e., value-independent of the valuer).  When we speak of human 
rights, for example, we suggest that persons, by the very fact that they are persons, have 
worth or intrinsic value.  On the other hand, extrinsic value assigns utility to something.   
  Katie McShane, environmental ethicist and scholar, accurately pointed out that 
we do not simply happen to value some things extrinsically, while valuing others 
intrinsically.  “While these judgments will usually be context dependent,” McShane says, 
“they are nonetheless very important in our thinking about what to do and how to feel.”32  
Thus, what we believe has intrinsic and extrinsic value has been important in shaping the 
debate historically in environmental ethics.  For instance, it is difficult to deny all living 
things on this planet can be interrelated in some way, however indirectly, as each life is a 
participant within a biotic community, an ecology.  Quite simply, if it lives, then it 
participates.  For many, it naturally follows that all forms of life are of intrinsic value.  If 
this is so, then it becomes problematic to treat the environment, and indeed all living 
creatures, as simply extrinsic to human concerns.  Yet as Lynn White noted, we in the 
West encourage the exploitation of the environment for our own ends.  If all living things 
have intrinsic value, how can we justify their systematic exploitation?  How can we treat 
the environment as merely a means to an end?  Yet we want to survive; it can be argued 
that survival, for us, has intrinsic value.  And survival means we must at some level 
exploit or use the environment.  If we are to be consistent, then how can we accommodate 
both the intrinsic value of both the environment and our own species?  In what sense are 
‘use’ and ‘exploitation’ understood?  Are they the same or is there a difference?  If there 
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is a difference how are we to understand the difference?  In essence, how do we compare 
the value of one thing against another?  Clearly differing intrinsic values can be at odds 
with each other.  How do we fit various forms of life into our understanding of the kinds 
of value and the relations among them?  
 For instance, in the context of Arne Naess’ eight-point platform (see pp. 13-14) 
the flourishing of all life has intrinsic value, regardless of its utility.  If we agree on 
Naess’ third point in the eight-point platform, that man has no right to reduce the richness 
and diversity of this planet apart from satisfying his vital needs, do we not assume that all 
beings, as it were, are equal?  We turn then to a brief sketch of how this question has been 
historically handled.  Our aim is not to be exhaustive but to simply highlight a selection 
of common approaches to the question. 
 
Moral Equality 
The issue of making comparative judgments, raised in the previous section, challenges us 
to consider whether the concept of intrinsic value has any moral significance at all.  For 
instance, what might it actually mean for human deliberation about the environment to 
say, “all life is equal”?  Oftentimes the intrinsic value attributed to a thing is given in 
virtue of some other extrinsic property or value attributed to it.  In direct contrast to the 
notion of intrinsic value, which states an object has value in and of itself, independent 
from any supposed utility, extrinsic value is subjective.   
Relevant here is Michael J. Zimmerman’s discussion of this transitiveness of 
intrinsic value.  He writes: “The possibility that something A is intrinsically better than 
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something else B, which is itself intrinsically better than some third thing C, and yet A is 
not intrinsically better than C,” is extremely problematic.33  To suggest that there are 
degrees of intrinsic value is counter to the whole notion of intrinsic value in and of itself.  
So, then, what type of thing can be intrinsically valuable?  Zimmerman points out 
that some take a conservative, monistic approach, “to which there is just one kind of 
bearer of intrinsic value,” while others take on a pluralistic approach.34  In his view, if we 
are to avoid a conflict between the two approaches, it is better that we do not understand 
intrinsic value to be a property of objects themselves.  For example, some claim that the 
property of a thing can hold intrinsic value (i.e., being alive); others claim that facts are 
the bearers of intrinsic value (i.e. the fact that someone is alive); others still claim that 
states of affairs of something or someone hold intrinsic value (i.e. the state of being 
alive).35  “Ontologists often divide entries into two fundamental classes; those that are 
abstract and those that are concrete.  Unfortunately, there is no consensus on just how this 
distinction is to be drawn.”36  Most would classify those listed above (properties, facts, 
and states of affairs) as abstract.  What, then, is a concrete intrinsic value?  Unfortunately, 
as Zimmerman points out, there is no consensus on how we draw this distinction.  No 
simple formula exists to determine the intrinsic value of a complex whole because of 
something G.E. Moore, author of the Principia Ethica, identified as the “principle of 
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organic unities,” which suggests that the intrinsic value of a whole cannot be seen as a 
sum of the intrinsic values of its parts.37 
Naess can be seen to take on such an approach.  He reveals this in the first point of 
his eight-point platform (see pp. 13-14), wherein he states that the well-being and 
flourishing of all human and non-human life has intrinsic value independent of the 
usefulness to human life.  This flourishing is a state of affairs that is intrinsically valuable 
for human and non-human life, independent of the value of each individual being within 
the ecosphere.  Naess acknowledges that some exploitation is necessary for the 
flourishing of human life (i.e. for purposes of survival).  So, what does this say about 
moral equality?  A central affirmation within deep ecology is the principle of 
“biospherical egalitarianism,” which on the surface would suggest that there are no moral 
differences between human and non-human species. 
Beginning in the 17th century, the prevailing understanding of moral equality was 
grounded in the tradition of natural law and social contract theory.  For instance, Thomas 
Hobbes believed that man is by nature equal to all other men, especially in his capacity to 
inflict harm.  The will to fulfill individual desires is what drives human beings, and 
because of such independence, individual perceptions of good and evil are entirely 
subjective. To strive to fulfill one’s own desires inevitably leads to the belligerence and 
hostility toward others in their attempts to do the same.  
Hobbes argues that the most compelling force in man’s natural condition is the 
fear of (violent) death; in order to avoid being placed in a situation where his safety is 
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jeopardized, it is necessary that he enters into social contract, which in turn protects the 
“natural rights” – the desire of peace – on the part of each individual.  For one to threaten 
the life of another is to forfeit his place in this social contract, and thus forfeit his own 
human nature (the right to peace and life).   
Contrary to the Aristotelian view of what constitutes the good life, Hobbes argues 
that in man’s state of nature, no group of people is capable of reaching an agreement in 
what the good life is.  Rather, each man independently determines for himself what is 
good.  Happiness is based on self-interest; it is fulfilling one’s own will and desire, and 
contrary to the ancient thinkers “who thought that experiencing continual desire was 
slavery to our passions… Hobbes argues that life itself is the feeling of desires.  [And if] 
that feeling should cease, life itself would cease.”38   
Although man’s natural condition consists of equality, so too does it embody 
unbounded liberty, fear (namely of violent death), and as mentioned above, the desire to 
preserve one’s own life.  Naess would scarcely disagree on this point, for the flourishing 
of all life holds value.  Man is entirely free in his state of nature; yet for Hobbes, such 
unbounded liberty is largely problematic vis-à-vis other men.  Perpetual peace of mind is 
virtually impossible.  Laurie M. Johnson Bagby describes Hobbes’ case, stating that being 
content is “a form of death, which could actually lead to one’s physical destruction 
because others may take advantage and move in to take away what a man has acquired;” 
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it follows that not only is the continual pursuit of fulfilling one’s desires the core of 
happiness, “but it is also the logical means of security and survival.”39  
For Hobbes, morality in man’s egalitarian natural condition fails to extend beyond 
one’s individual rational self-interests.  Good and evil are reduced to individual desires 
(i.e. self-preservation) and fears (i.e. violent death).  Man will do everything in his power 
to fulfill his desires and deter anything that threatens him in attaining them. 
There is little difficulty in applying this theory to, say, a discussion of animal 
rights.  In Hobbes’ theory, “[animals], in general, pose very little threat to us.  And, more 
importantly, not being rational agents, they cannot coherently be regarded as 
contractors… [and thus we] have nothing to gain from attempting to do so.”40  It follows 
that they appear to be lacking in moral significance and are thus not included in man’s 
considerations. 
Contrary to Hobbes’ conception of the non-human animal, the theory of Kantian 
contractarianism provides “a framework for the attribution of moral rights to non-human 
animals… [and] an expression of the idea that individuals have equal moral status, 
whatever their physical or intellectual capacities,” socio-economic condition, or their 
concept of the good.41  Contemporary philosopher Mark Rowlands argues that proper 
equal consideration involves reaching beyond the human sphere to acknowledge the 
moral rights (or moral entitlements) of at least some non-human animals.  He explains 
this theory as follows: 
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An individual, I, possesses a moral right R, relative to theory T, if 
among the entailments of T is the proposition that I is entitled to the 
treatment, or to the freedom, prescribed by R.  Thus, if theory T 
contains the principle “Thou shalt not kill!” and if you fall under the 
scope of this principle, then you are, according to T, entitled, at least 
prima facie, not to be killed (by anyone else who falls under the scope 
of this principle).  And, on the present understanding of the concept 
of a moral right, this means that, relative to T, you have a right not to 
be killed by any other individual who falls under the scope of the 
principle…  One possesses moral rights only relative to moral theories 
and principles, and to the extent that one falls under the scope of 
these.42 
Theory T as described above contains the principle, “Thou shalt not kill!” yet is 
not limited to it due to the fact that this theory may contain the primary principle of 
concern for a species’ own well-being.  This is to say that, contrary to adopting an 
extreme principle of bio-centrism, we might find ourselves concerned with maintaining 
our own comfort and existence which can be achieved through the inclusion and care of 
the biotic whole.  Like Hobbes, Kant argues that individual men are self-interested and 
often act in direct conflict with another, and “that they are advancing unconsciously under 
the guidance of a Purpose of Nature [or instinct] which is unknown to them."43  It is when 
men are regarded as a whole that they “are not guided in their efforts merely by instinct, 
like the lower animals; nor do they proceed in their actions, like the citizens of a purely 
rational world, according to a preconcerted plan.”44  For Kant, it is this which separates 
man from beast – man is not subject to a regular systematic history like animals seem to 
be.  Similarly, Kant affirmed man to be the sole rational creature on the planet, an oft held 
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reference for ethical deliberation in today’s world.  It is a difficult thing to deny certain 
attachment to our humanity, and to take on a specifically bio-centric worldview seems to 
be quite counterintuitive to many in the West.  However, in Kant’s moral philosophy, 
there is an emphasis on seeking “self-knowledge: not a knowledge of right and wrong – 
that we already possess – but a knowledge of what we desire as persons with powers of 
free theoretical and practical reason.”45   
According to Tim Hayward, Kant’s ethics are “widely viewed as inimical to 
environmental values, as arbitrary and morally impoverished, because, while exalting the 
value of human, rational beings, it denies moral consideration to non-human, or non-
rational beings.”46  Yet it has been argued that Kant attempts to make us conscious of the 
idea that moral law is rooted in our free reason and does not seek to teach us precisely 
what is right or wrong.47  Lonergan’s and Naess’ methods teach us something similar.  
While their methods for ethical deliberation might be viewed as somewhat prescriptive, 
they approach morality as rooted in our humanity, of which free reason is a quality, rather 
than something rooted in our free reason.  Naess and Lonergan both point out man’s 
ability to stretch his awareness beyond his own self-interest.  Morality, or knowledge and 
action of what is good and true and concrete, is our potential. 
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Troubles with Intrinsic Value 
Endless troubles of course arise when discussing moral equality, especially with regard to 
contract theories, as such theories might suggest moral equality cannot exist if intrinsic 
value is ascribed to a thing.  However, I would suggest that simply because intrinsic value 
may be ascribed to a thing, it does not make it false value.  In fact, I would argue that this 
is the nature of self-realization. 
In her article titled Why Environmental Ethics Shouldn’t Give Up on Intrinsic 
Value, Katie McShane argues that there is a common call among environmental theorists 
to discard the view that nature possesses intrinsic value on the grounds that the concept is 
not helpful in understanding why the environment should matter. 
She outlines the three main criticisms of the idea as follows: First, “the notion that 
things can possess value independently of the relations they have to other things suggests 
a peculiarly atomistic picture of the world.”48  But the more our knowledge of the world 
grows, the more we understand that it consists of things that are interrelated, 
interdependent, and identified by their relations with other things.  Within the 
environmentalist discourse, there is a push to view natural relationships as 
interdependent, and it would be unusual to see value as something that stands alone.  So, 
an appropriate way of avoiding this problem is through inheriting a type of ecology of 
values – an idea that relates each value to the next, creating an interdependent relationship 
between each.49 
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The second critique lies in the creation of a “metaphysically elaborate (and 
therefore dubious) picture of the world;” it has been suggested that to believe intrinsic 
value exists implies that values could exist before human conception of them.50  Value, if 
understood this way, would not be a property of an object, but would be as an object in 
and of itself. 
The final critique of the intrinsic value argument is that it is simply unnecessary.  
Critics maintain that we do not need the argument in order to articulate the importance of 
those things we value – extrinsic arguments are just as, if not more, appropriate.51  
McShane provides the example of old-growth forests: we do not need to demonstrate that 
the forest possesses intrinsic value to make a case against its destruction; we can do just 
as well by revealing the likely effects that destroying it would have on us.  To understand 
that a thing’s destruction, like the old-growth forest, would lead to a negative effect on 
something we care about (i.e., the well-being of our species, and the interrelatedness of 
ours with others in the biosphere), is to credit it with a certain degree of value.  It is a 
blatant recognition of the unified nature of man and environment.  McShane states: 
It is this connection between the kind of value people think something 
has and attitudes they think it makes sense to take toward it that largely 
explains the interest in the concept of intrinsic value from environmental 
ethicists.  The idea, I think, is this: we can, do, and should take some of 
the same intrinsically valuing attitudes toward things in the nonhuman 
natural world that we do toward things in the human world.  We can, do, 
and should at least sometimes think of some part of the natural world as 
appropriate objects of awe, reverence, respect, and love.  We should not 
reserve this role in our emotional lives for humans [and animals] alone.52 
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 In line with the Kantian contract outlined earlier, nothing exists alone in this 
world, and for McShane there is no reason for us to consider things as isolated individuals 
for the purpose of ethics.53  Within any ethical discourse, there is a need to look beyond 
the individual toward the whole.  To do so is to remove the characteristic of otherness, 
and begin to find unity under one moral compass.  In order to develop an environmental 
ethic that might sustain our natural environment, as well as those who partake in it, such a 
principle is necessary.  It is important to avoid ascribing to nature an instrumental value, 
and rather introduce to it something we might understand as internal, entirely objective in 
character.  However intrinsically good is understood, it must be understood concretely, 
which is to say that it is good in the particular case under consideration.  In this context, 
acts of intrinsic valuing must be both meaningful and attainable.  It makes little sense to 
espouse, for example, a ‘love of humanity’ but promote racism.  
 In this brief sketch of various past efforts to understand the meaning and use of the 
notion of intrinsic value as applicable to the environmental questions, we have found 
considerable conceptual confusion or, at least, no consensus.  Yet, as we shall discover in 
the next chapters, both Naess and Lonergan propose methods to unify or organize what 
presently appears separate and alienated.  For both, ‘self-knowledge’ understood as ‘self-
realization (Naess) or ‘self-transcendence’ (Lonergan) provides us with leads for sorting 
out the confusion.  Naess and Lonergan both point to our human capacity to stretch our 
horizon or boundary of concern beyond our own self-interest.  For Lonergan, by being 
personally attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, we can go beyond or 
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transcend the constricted horizon of mere self-interest to embrace the whole universe as 
our horizon of concern.  For Naess’ deep ecology the horizon of concern extends to the 
non-sentient as well including the whole ecosphere, both sentient and non-sentient. 
 To identify what objects possess intrinsic value, we should consider the process of 
how we come to appreciate, choose, and act in terms of value.  As we shall see, while 
questions regarding intrinsic value are pointedly metaphysical, the process must be 
equally scientific.  For Lonergan, metaphysics is scientific.  This, according to Michael 
Shute, is “because of the methods and aims of the procedures.  Whereas common-sense 
intelligence aims at getting things done in the concrete world of living, science aims to 
understand the relationship of things to one another.”54  Only by being attentive, 
reasonable, and responsible can we hope to understand precisely what possesses intrinsic 
value.  To a fuller account of this approach, we now turn. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Lonergan’s Method: Intending an Understanding of the Human Good 
 
In chapters 2 and 4 of Method in Theology Lonergan develops notions of value, the 
human good, and religion that provide a very helpful context for appreciating Naess’ deep 
ecology and his concepts of ‘self-realization’ and ‘ecological self’ as implicitly religious.  
Both Lonergan and Naess understand ‘value’ as a transcendental notion, something that 
moves us beyond a mere orientation toward self-satisfaction to an appreciation of a large 
world of real values, ecological or otherwise.  For both, realizing the transcendental 
nature of value as an orientation in living involves the person in an ongoing shift or 
process of conversion.  Lonergan acknowledged that as a cognitional process 
transcendental method provides general categories for his theological method and does 
not explicitly supply the religious component. In order to apply transcendental method to 
theological method, it is necessary to consider the special context of religious 
experience.55  In any case, understanding the human good is foundational to 
understanding religion.  In this chapter, I provide a sketch of Lonergan’s transcendental 
method and his notions of value and conversion.  My ultimate intention is to provide a 
foundation for locating the implicit religious core of Naess' deep ecology. 
 Lonergan’s notion of value is built upon a life-long effort to develop foundations 
for a dynamic metaphysics.  In Insight, Chapter 18, Lonergan writes: “Metaphysics was 
conceived as the implementation of heuristic structure of proportionate being.  The 
fundamental question of the present chapter is whether ethics can be conceived in the 
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same fashion.”56  In what follows in Chapter 18, Lonergan lays out his argument for how 
ethics can be understood as such an implementation.  It would require a very lengthy 
detour to lay out and critically evaluate what Lonergan means by ‘the implementation of 
an integral heuristic structure.’  Our more modest aim is to provide a context for 
understanding what Lonergan means by value as transcendental, as Lonergan grounds his 
notions of value in a methodical dynamic metaphysics; it is the dynamic orientation of his 
metaphysics that grounds transcendental method which informs his notion of value in 
Method in Theology.  Moreover, and this is a crucial point, the key to the establishment of 
his dynamic metaphysics, and so transcendental method, is the method of self-
appropriation which he first introduces in Insight.  While self-appropriation in its full 
measure includes all human conscious experience – knowledge, deliberation, decision, 
and action – insofar as he was establishing the notion of an integral heuristic structure of 
proportionate being, the primary focus is on cognitional process.  To take a brief step 
back, in developing a dynamic metaphysics, Lonergan turned scholastic metaphysics 
inside out.  In scholastic metaphysics, the ideal was a static, deductive, and universal set 
of categories grounded in a deduction from first principles.  From the underpinnings of 
such a metaphysics all else followed, including ethics.  Lonergan, however, came to the 
realization that underlying any metaphysics were prior epistemological and cognitional 
questions, at the core of which are cognitional structure and process.  How we understand 
the basic operations of cognitional process grounds subsequent epistemological and 
metaphysical positions.  In his own investigation of cognitional process, he discovered 
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that a basic pattern of intentional operations was common to all instances of human 
knowing, and these included what we know of ethics and religion.  An account of these 
basic operations reveals a dynamic normative (i.e. self-corrective) set of structured terms 
and relations out of which we can develop an ethic.   
We turn in this chapter to an initial sketch of the core operations and elements of 
cognitional structure.  As we shall discover, this account is non-logical at its core, 
dynamic, and self-corrective, not only with respect to understanding, but also with respect 
to value.  It is the same fundamental dynamic process that informs his notions of religion 
and religious value. 
Because this method is a pattern of operations that are engaged in every cognitional 
activity, it follows that the process is accessible to all people.  If used correctly, it is a 
method that transcends mere data, allowing us to identify the human good which will 
ultimately enable us to become better, more informed, decision-makers.  Method does 
inspire – or is inspired by – a spirit of inquiry.  As we learn, our inquiries repeat, 
demanding accurate observation and lauding discovery.  Lonergan writes: “[Method] 
insists on … the formulation of discoveries in hypotheses, and hypotheses recur.  It 
requires the deduction of the implications of hypotheses, and deductions recur.  It keeps 
arguing that experiments be devised and performed to check the implications of 
hypotheses against observable fact, and such processes of experimentation recur.”57 
The ability to inquire leads to the ability to be critical.  The results of critical 
thinking throughout the process of such operations are cumulative and progressive, 
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producing new data, observations, and descriptions that either verify or refute a 
hypothesis.  If each operation leads to a confirmatory result, it can be assumed that the 
hypothesis is not off track, and a theory might be formulated; yet if the result is 
otherwise, new data is revealed and the hypothesis must be modified, thus repeating the 
process of logical derivation.  Each new discovery is added to our increasing “pool” of 
available knowledge, and each time we are either correct or incorrect, we learn.  
The ability to inquire is, of course, dependent upon ‘consciousness.’  I do not refer 
here to wakefulness or the state of being alive, but rather a level of awareness or 
cognizance – the ability to learn.  Lonergan divides consciousness and intentionality into 
four levels on which we operate: 
First is the empirical level upon which we are able to sense, perceive, imagine, feel, 
speak, etc.  The second level is based on the intellect, wherein we are able to inquire, 
understand, express these understandings, and “work out the presuppositions and 
implications of our expression.”  We reflect, gather evidence and data, and make 
decisions regarding truth or falsehood and probability on the third, rational, level of 
consciousness.  It is the fourth level, the level of responsibility, on which we “are 
concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and…deliberate about possible 
courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions.”58 
Each operation is distinct but related and each set of relations creates a 
pattern which is described as the correct way of doing things.  Each object within 
this pattern of operations (i.e. “seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, 
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inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, 
marshalling, and weighing the evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, 
deciding, speaking, writing”59) is intentional, or rather intended.  This pattern of 
operations is consciously performed, and through these operations the subject is 
conscious.  Operations may be repeated indefinitely while the results are 
cumulative (not repetitious). 
The operations are of course diverse, and so too are the objects intended by them. 
Lonergan’s four levels of consciousness and intentionality can be outlined simply: 
Level I  Experience / observation  
Level II Understanding / inquiry  
Level III Judgement / interiority  
Level IV Decision / action  
On the first level, the empirical level, we experience the world.  It is important to 
remember that we do so through the lens of our ultimate principles – how we experience 
the world depends upon what we believe the world to be (that is, our religious or 
philosophical worldviews).  But if we are to proceed level by level, with progressive 
results, it is important, as we already know, to be attentive, reasonable, and responsible.  
We do this by experiencing our experiences, understandings, judgments, and decisions.  
On this level, data is received. 
On the second, the intellectual level, we find understanding: inquiring, 
understanding, conceiving, and so forth.  Data is analyzed on this level.   
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The third, the rational level, is the level of judgement: here we reflect, marshal 
and weigh evidence, pass judgment on the truth, or otherwise, of a statement. 
On the fourth, the responsible level, we make decisions: considering 
possible courses of action, evaluating them, deciding whether to carry them out, 
etc.60  This level of consciousness sublates the prior levels and reaches beyond 
them.  It “sets up a new principle and type of operations, directs them to a new goal 
but, so far from dwarfing them, preserves them and brings them to a far fuller 
fruition.”61  As we move through the first to the fourth level of consciousness, we 
are aware of ourselves, but as we reach the fourth level we become better able to 
understand the good (or value, or truth), becoming increasingly better judges.  
Without the effort to understand, we would have no opportunity to judge.  The 
recurrent pattern of logical derivation from our ultimate premises leads to 
hypotheses, which lead to action, which leads to further questions, which lead to a 
revision of our ultimate premises.   
Lonergan’s process for transcendental method is akin to Naess’ process for 
normative method – which we will discuss further in the following chapter – in that the 
operations within it are not limited to just operations on terms and relations.  It intends a 
higher level of consciousness – a conversion. 
Outlined in Method in Theology, the objects intended by attentiveness, 
reasonableness, and responsibility are transcendental notions.  Attentiveness allows us to 
proceed past experience by allowing us to ask the “what, why, how” questions.  
                                                          
60 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 9. 
61 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 316. 
38 
Reasonableness allows us to proceed beyond the answers from attentiveness to ask 
whether or not the answers are true.  Responsibility moves us beyond fact and desire to 
allow us the ability to discern what is truly good and what is only apparently so.   
While categories are needed to put determinate questions and give 
determinate answers, the transcendentals are contained in questions prior 
to the answers.  They are the radical intending that moves us from 
ignorance to knowledge.  They are a priori because they go beyond what 
we know to seek what we do not know yet.  They are unrestricted because 
answers are never complete and so only give rise to still further questions.  
They are comprehensive because they intend the unknown whole or 
totality of which our answers reveal only part.62 
What makes Lonergan’s method ‘transcendental’ is that the results we are 
intending through deliberation are matters of the human mind.  This is to say that this 
particular method addresses transcendental – or universal – notions, such as value, as 
discussed above. 
Value is a transcendental notion and to engage in the act of ethical deliberation is 
to engage in the act of intending.  Such intending is not knowing – inquiry is the quest for 
knowledge, and inquiry into what is valuable is the quest to understand what value is.  
Transcendental notions elevate the subject to a higher level of consciousness – from a 
level of experience to one that is intellectual, from the intellectual to rational, and from 
the rational to existential.  Such notions provide the measures which reveal whether the 
subject’s goals are being reached.63  We are driven by these notions and are only satisfied 
when the truth is reached.  It is the process of self-realization.  And like in the sciences, 
self-realization is knowledge in process.  It is the method. 
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Lonergan also makes note that we must not be misled in believing that 
transcendental notions, though they are broad, are abstract.  While the concept of what is 
valuable (and ultimately good) may seem vague, transcendental notions, like value, are 
the source of our questioning.  As we reach an answer, so too do we formulate new 
questions, and continue along in this cycle, each time transcending the level of 
intelligence on which we previously stood: 
Only the concrete is good.  Again, as the transcendental notions of the 
intelligible, the true, the real head for a complete intelligibility, all truth, 
the real in its every part and aspect, so the transcendental notion of the 
good heads for a goodness that is beyond criticism.  For that notion is our 
raising questions for deliberation.  It is our being stopped with the 
disenchantment that asks whether what we are doing is worthwhile.  That 
disenchantment brings to light the limitation in every finite achievement, 
the stain in every flawed perfection, the irony of soaring ambition and 
faltering performance…In brief, the transcendental notion of the good so 
invites, presses, harries us, that we could rest only in an encounter with a 
goodness completely beyond its powers of criticism.64 
Lonergan’s method is an excellent basis for an establishing a standard course for 
ethical deliberation, which ultimately intends knowledge of what is good in all fields.  If 
what is good is concrete in every aspect of every instance, what we are trying to achieve 
through ethical deliberation is a full moral awareness – we are reaching toward a meta-
ethic, around which there are no discrepancies or misunderstandings. 
Essential to our discussion are the twelve key features of Lonergan’s 
method, which effectively complement Naess’ own method and ultimately orient 
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religion in our analysis.  It will be expedient within this discussion to address each, 
though briefly. 
First, it is normative.  That is to say it has norms, which, in the case of 
transcendental method, are to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.  
Before each of these precepts can be formulated or expressed, they must “have a prior 
existence and reality in the spontaneous, structured dynamism of [the four levels of] 
human consciousness.”65   
Second, transcendental method is critical.  Essentially, it is a working backward 
from false judgments about reality or ultimate premises to the actual performance of 
what Lonergan calls a “mistaken theorist.”  Being critical allows us to learn. 
Third is the dialectical function.  Criticalness can be applied to every mistaken 
cognitional theory, so one can determine the dialectical series of basic positions and 
counter-positions.  Dialectic has to do with conflicts that modify an individual’s 
mentality and ultimate premises.  The dialectical function aims at an all-inclusive 
viewpoint from which it can proceed to an informed understanding.  
Fourth is the systematic function.  According to Naess, “systematizations of norms 
and hypotheses are needed in research motivated by pedagogical, ethical, political, or 
other large-scale movements.”66  A systematic method helps to unify and coordinate, as 
it brings to focus “the basic premises and fundamental norms that guide concrete actions 
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and minor research units having meaning only within, or mainly within, a major 
normative framework.”67 
Fifth, systematization promises continuity.  As a research instrument, 
systematization must allow for flexibility.  The terms and relations within a normative 
system refer to the operations of cognitional process and link each operation to the next.  
As outlined above, the four levels of consciousness are described as experience (level 
one, empirical), understanding (level two, intellectual), judgement (level three, rational), 
and decision (level four, responsible).  Being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and 
responsible does not impose rigidity.  Being flexible means allowing for various levels of 
preciseness, as well as alternative terminologies: Naess makes the same point as follows: 
“Modifications can be carried out through the reinterpretation of terms and sentences as 
well as through negating or modifying propositions. ... [Systematizations] visualize 
complicated logical or, more generally, cognitive relationships between important clusters 
of prescriptions and descriptions.”68 
Sixth, transcendental method, as a normative method, is heuristic.  Within a method 
such as this one, we can divide the language into two categories: first, norms, which 
propose a set of tentative guidelines, and second, hypotheses, which are indicative of 
testability rather than uncertainty.  Because norms offer tentative guidelines and 
hypotheses can be tested, it holds that both can be reviewed and modified.  The goal of 
every inquiry is to make known something that is currently unknown.  As a hypothesis is 
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tested, new data brings to light the accuracies or inaccuracies of the original query.  Refer 
to the apron diagram (pg. 45) and we are able to see this heuristic process of learning. 
Seventh is the foundational function.  According to Thomas Naickamparambil, 
“[since] the essence of this method is constituted by the very structures of human 
cognition, any human inquiry in any field whatsoever has to respect this method if it is to 
be successful… True knowledge can result only from the implementation of this 
method.”69  Understanding that a normative method offers a normative pattern of 
recurrent and related operations that yield cumulative and progressive results, it follows 
that the foundational function of transcendental method is developed through the 
occurrence of proper norms progressing from the cumulative experiences of investigators 
from varying fields of expertise.  It is a naturally interdisciplinary method, a method of 
methods, and is characterized by Lonergan as the “rock” upon which all cognitive 
operations are built.   
Eighth is the function of theology, or in this context, the matter of the spirit – that 
which is a mystery, that which offers order, intelligibility, and comfort in our universe.  
Matters of the spirit are an important factor in the way we understand the environment – 
and the entire human experience – because they begin with our ultimate premises (based 
on religious or spiritual value) which ultimately influence our ethics.  All decision-
making derives from the ultimate ground for all knowledge.  This is perhaps the most 
important function within this discussion.  The theological implications of transcendental 
method reinforce the connection between matter and spirit stressed by Naess. 
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This leads us to the ninth function of transcendental method, which is the fact that 
matters of the spirit are not outside the field of inquiry.  By having the ability to modify 
our ultimate premises, we must be able to ask theological questions.  The fact that one has 
a question means there is, somewhere, an answer – though the answer may be that the 
question itself is wrong.  All questions anticipate intelligibility, so it follows that matters 
of the spirit are within our realm of knowing.  The transcendental field is unrestricted, 
though “not in the sense that the transcendental notions are abstract... [but are rather] 
comprehensive; they intend everything about everything.  So far from being abstract, it is 
by them that we intend the concrete, i.e., all that is to be known about a thing.”70  Greater 
knowledge means more specific questions, which means more testable hypotheses, which 
means more definite answers.  More definite answers lead us to action, which brings us 
back again to a modification of ultimate premises and ever more questions.  It is 
important to note that this is not to say human knowing is necessarily unlimited.  
Arguably, it is not.  However the transcendental field is defined by what man can ask – 
not by what he knows – and given that we can ask more questions than perhaps we can 
answer, we are able to better understand the limitations of our knowledge. 71 Tenth, 
Lonergan adds that we do not add any new resources to theology simply because we 
designate transcendental method a role in theology.  Rather it “draws attention to a 
resource that has always been used.  For transcendental method is the concrete and 
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dynamic unfolding of human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and 
responsibility.”72 
While transcendental method may not bring anything new to theology, it does add 
much to the execution of spiritual tasks.  Our eleventh function of transcendental method 
lies in that the method itself provides a key to unification of all fields of knowledge.  This 
is not to say that plurality is extinguished from the world.  However, when applied to the 
natural sciences or to fields of ethics, for example, it becomes possible to imagine a future 
wherein all people can find “common norms, foundations, systematics, and common 
critical, dialectical, and heuristic procedures.”73 
The final function of transcendental method, a heightening of consciousness, brings 
to light our conscious and intentional operations.  It allows us to not only ask “How did 
we get here?” but gives us the ability to approach the question of “Where do we go from 
here?” with an informed self-luminous judgement.  The answers to these ultimate 
questions are cognitional, epistemological, and metaphysical, and particularly ontological, 
for “[to] know the good, it must know the real; to know the real, it must know the true; to 
know the true, it must know the intelligible; to know the intelligible, it must attend to the 
data.”74 
 Self-realization is the ultimate achievement – to attain it is to attain a concrete 
judgement of value.  True judgements of value, however, reach beyond intentional self-
realization toward a moral self-transcendence.  It is one thing to know good, and it is 
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another to do good.  As Lonergan states, an individual can know what is right and not do 
it.  The judgement of value is a reality in the “moral order,” and “[by] it, the subject 
moves beyond pure and simple knowing.  By it the subject is constituting himself as 
proximately capable of moral [self-realization], of benevolence and beneficence, of true 
loving.”75  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Naess’ Method: Reaching Toward Self-Realization 
 
Naess’ method for deep ecology is profoundly complementary to Lonergan’s 
transcendental method.  The transcendental method introduced by Lonergan is meant to 
be transcultural, much akin to Naess’ own method for deep ecology.  His method is 
similarly metaphysical, it is heuristic, and it describes ultimate methodological 
foundations for decision-making.  Like Lonergan, the goal in Naess’ normative method is 
to reach a state of self-realization, understand what is good and concrete, and become 
effective ethical decision-makers.   
 
The Basics of Deep Ecology 
First and foremost, it is important to point out that there is no single and true deep 
ecology.  The term “deep ecology” was first coined by Arne Naess in his 1972 paper, 
“The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement.”76  It was a call for a volte-
face in environmental thinking that would surpass anthropocentrism and an ethic centred 
on simple policy-reform.  Deep ecology proposed a different way of looking at the world; 
unlike other movements within environmental ethical discourse, deep ecology offers a 
method that can be used to answer to the question, “Where do we go from here?” by first 
probing questions of how it is we got here in the first place.  It is an exploration of the 
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root causes of environmental problems and of a fundamental environmental worldview 
that inspires policy. 
Deep ecology is differentiated from what Naess refers to as shallow ecology, 
which generally directs its focus to principles of a socio-economic concern and doesn’t 
reach a level of ultimate value.  Shallow ecological concerns may indeed be of 
importance in terms of the environmental crisis, but as Naess writes: “[there] are deeper 
concerns which touch upon principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, 
decentralization, symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness.”77   
Supporters of the deep ecology movement come from a rich background of 
diverse religious traditions and philosophical and cultural backgrounds.  There is no one 
set of rules that one must adhere to in order to be a supporter of the movement; because of 
this, to call oneself a “deep ecologist” is not quite correct.  For Naess, emphasizing that 
supporters do not necessarily hold the same basic philosophical or religious premises is 
important.  These premises naturally vary because of individuals’ cultural differences.  
Nevertheless, as Naess says himself, “the platform of the movement can be grounded in 
religion or philosophy, including ethics.  It can also be said to be derived from these 
fundaments.”78 
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Eight-Point Platform: A Discussion of “Rights” 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Naess worked on a series of revisions relating to the 
ideas he first presented.  To facilitate discussions around deep ecology amongst the 
philosophically-minded, he sought to distinguish a common platform of deep ecology 
from those fundamental features of the various religions and philosophies from which 
those platforms are derived, provided it is formulated around factual assumptions. 
The term platform is preferred to principle because the latter may be 
misunderstood to refer to ultimate premises. Furthermore, the formulations 
of a platform should be short and concise (as a synopsis), whereas the 
fundamental premises are Buddhist, Taoist, Christian, or of other religious 
kinds, or they are philosophical with affinities to the basic views of 
Spinoza, Whitehead, Heidegger, or others. Different sets of fundamentals 
are normally more or less incompatible, or at least difficult to compare in 
terms of cognitive contents. Supporters of deep ecology may have great 
difficulties in understanding each other's ultimate views, but not sets of 
penultimate ones as formulated as a kind of platform they have largely in 
common.79 
In general, most supporters of deep ecology have some general and abstract views 
in common, and as a result, the eight-point platform was created.  These points are not 
rules per se, nor do they represent some deep ecological doctrine, a set of 
commandments, which all supporters must abide by.  Rather, Naess describes this 
platform as a set of general and abstract statements that appear to be accepted by the 
majority of deep ecology supporters.  They are ‘reference points’ and not every one is 
critical – indeed, Naess himself is unable to commit to one way only of formulating each 
point.80   
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Different supporters hold different total views that are inspired partially by 
reactions to the environmental crisis.  These views are what Naess calls ecosophies, and 
they vary.  It is for this reason that Naess claims the platform does not contain any point 
that implies, for instance, nature mysticism.  However, by following the method laid out 
in deep ecology, one can hone in on what is ultimately good and what holds intrinsic 
value.  Naess describes deep ecology as a total view comprising various levels in close 
contact with one another, best laid out in his well-known apron diagram (below): 
                                                          
scope covering our relations to nonhuman beings. The search for an environmental ethic is, as I see it, a 
laudable undertaking from the point of view of the deep ecology movement…Like many others, I 
distinguish between an ethic as a normative system…and acts of moralizing – that is, when one individual 
or group admonishes others to follow certain moral precepts…[I continue to emphasize] the rather limited 
motivational force or moralizing.” 
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Apron Diagram 
 
Apron Diagram. See Arne Naess, “The Apron Diagram,” in The Deep Ecology Movement: An 
Introductory Anthology, eds. Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 
1995), 11. 
The diagram reveals a heuristic method for ethical deliberation and is based on 
logical relations between premises and resulting conclusions, much like scientific method.  
Naess admits that the platform of deep ecology (found on the second level of the 
diagram) is grounded in religion or philosophy.81  However, he notes that this “situation 
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only reminds us that a set of very similar or even identical conclusions may be drawn 
from divergent premises.  The platform is the same, the fundamental premises differ.”82   
There are four key levels to consider in this diagram.  First is the level dictated by 
one’s ultimate premises (i.e. religious or philosophical worldviews), or that which 
ultimately guides a person through the process of ethical deliberation.  On the second 
level are the principles laid out in the eight-point platform.83  One proceeds to the third 
level, which is essentially the consequences derived from the eight-point platform, and 
then on to the fourth level, which is the practical decision made in a concrete situation.   
Helpful to our discussion is to understand the basics of scientific method, which 
can be laid out simply, on four basic levels:   
Level I  Observation of phenomena; premise for understanding  
Level II Principles and hypotheses  
Level III Test formulations  
Level IV Theory and practical action  
Such a method is heuristic.  On the first level, observations are made.  These 
observations can be broad or they can be narrow and focused; it does not matter.  From 
our observations, we are able to formulate principles and hypotheses that will explain the 
phenomena that were observed in the first level.  Thirdly, hypotheses are tested through 
experiments which produce conclusions, predicted or otherwise.  On the fourth and final 
level, theories are developed and put into practice.  After we test and understand a theory, 
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it is only natural that the way phenomena are observed will change, thus tweaking or fine-
tuning our (ultimate) premises. 
Providing a picture of this method applied to deep ecology, Naess’ apron diagram 
is practical and logical, albeit somewhat abstract.  It is meant to explore the logical 
relations between premises and their conclusions.  As in scientific method, the method 
used in the deep ecology framework requires us to make observations, ask questions, test 
hypotheses, analyze data, use inductive and deductive reasoning, and act accordingly.  
The process is repeated continually as we learn from applying our findings to practical 
action.  Another way to visualize Naess’ method found in the diagram is to sum it up in 
the same way we did scientific method.   
Level I  Ultimate premises  
Level II Movement platform principles 
Level III Normative or factual hypotheses and policies 
Level IV Practical decisions and actions 
The apron diagram is a static model according to Naess, but the sentences and 
premises on each level can be modified at any time.  New information inevitably changes 
existing hypotheses, which in turn will change the norms based on these hypotheses.  
Like scientific method, Naess’ method outlined in his apron diagram encourages deep 
questioning. 
From a point of view of normative systematizations, what goes on 
when changes are made at one or more levels is rather complicated. 
But part of it is processes of [logical] derivation. The [diagram] 
pretends only to illustrate important differences of the levels of 
derivation and the specific character of level 2.  It represents a 
condensed formulation of the deepest level norms and hypotheses 
which most supporters of the deep ecology movement can agree 
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upon.  This level is illustrated as the penultimate… level of 
argumentation characteristic of those supporters of deep ecology 
who try to articulate their very basic views. At the third and fourth 
levels disagreements may arise. At the first level supporters with 
entirely different backgrounds disagree, or find each other's views 
more or less incomprehensible.84 
Not only is the method for deep ecology laid out by Naess akin to normative 
scientific method, but we can see that it is also similar to Lonergan’s own transcendental 
method.  As in Lonergan’s method, Naess’ method for deep ecology is both grounded in 
and proceeds from the experiences found in the first level. 
Fundamental to Lonergan’s transcendental method is the aim of self-
transcendence.  As in transcendental method, the essence of deep ecology is self-
realization.  In order to solve the problem of the environmental crisis, Naess argues that 
we must undergo a radical conversion, moving beyond the individual self (small s) to the 
greater, realized, ecological Self (capital S).  Through self-realization, human beings can 
live a richer, more fulfilling life brought about by knowledge of what is good and true.  
Such a conversion experience is hindered when the self-realization of others within our 
community is hindered.   
Naess’ deep ecology movement exhibits both plurality and unity: it encourages 
the diverse perspectives that may embody at least some of the eight points of the platform 
bringing those diverse perspectives under one umbrella.  The realization of the eight 
points “requires significant changes in both the rich and the poor countries and affects 
social, economic, technical, and lifestyle factors,” which include goals of protecting the 
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planet’s diversity of life for its own sake.85  For Naess, the conventional utilitarian 
mindset is outdated.  He holds that the natural world possesses an intrinsic value and 
integrity; human beings must experience a shift from a biocentric attitude (the notion that 
living beings alone have intrinsic value and integrity, identified as shallow ecology) to 
that of ecocentrism (the notion that all species and ecosystems within the biosphere have 
intrinsic value and integrity, most closely linked to the platform of deep ecology).  
Nothing truly exists alone in this world, and there is no reason in ethics for us to consider 
the individual in isolation.  We know that within any ethical discourse, we must look 
beyond the individual toward the whole.  The very word discourse tells us this.  To do so 
is to remove the characteristic of otherness, and begin to find unity under one moral 
umbrella.  To develop an environmental ethic that might sustain our natural environment, 
as well as those who partake in it, Naess’ deep ecology adopts this principle of unity.  The 
method employed by Naess, as well as that used by Lonergan, which both aim to uncover 
our place in the cosmos, to recognize the unity of all things, and to understand what truth 
and value really are, provide us with the tools required to make a concrete decision about 
how we are to proceed into the future. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In his book Dark Green Religion: Nature Spirituality and the Planetary Future, Bron 
Taylor suggests that we might look at the etymology of the word religion if we are to 
define it.  The Latin re (again) and ligare (to connect) suggests the meaning ‘to 
reconnect.’  From this, we may conclude that religion can be defined by that which binds 
or connects people to the things they most value.86  Yet while there may be dangers in 
seeking an explicit definition of the term, as we risk ignoring important phenomena, this 
definition is broad and encompassing.   
Anthropologist Benson Saler points out that by "avoiding an explicit commitment 
to a definition... we retain a certain flexibility.  Explicit definitions are explicit 
heuristics."87  If we maintain a polyfocal approach to understanding what religion means, 
we can better understand the myriad dimensions that comprise religious beliefs and we 
can reject the supposition that any single characteristic is essential to religious 
phenomena.  I believe that this definition maintains such an approach.  If we are to 
consider Naess’ deep ecology, the conversion experience that takes place when one 
approaches self-realization does indeed connect individuals – and communities – to the 
things they most value.  To achieve self-realization is to gain the ability to act beautifully, 
and not simply morally or immorally, as identified through Kant’s perception of duty.  
What distinguishes a beautiful act from one that is performed out of duty in adherence to 
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the moral law (you do it because you must), is that when one acts beautifully, one is 
doing so based on a natural inclination.  It is neither moral nor immoral (i.e. contrary to 
moral law).  Beautiful acts are done without pain or conflict.  This is not to say one 
cannot commit beautiful acts without first achieving self-realization.  Quite the opposite, 
in fact.  Yet to reach self-realization is to gain the ability to act beautifully in all 
situations.  In essence, by utilizing Naess’ method for decision-making, we are reaching 
toward enlightenment, acting out of love. 
Contrary to the Buddhist conception of enlightenment, the conversion experience 
found within Naess’ method is anchored in a matured and fully developed personality 
(the Self), which takes a long time and intensive action to develop.  Naess writes: “The 
distinction between external and internal action is fruitful, but a high level of activeness 
(‘causedness’ through oneself) is possible and is needed if one is to reach high levels of 
freedom (understanding, perfection).”88  In line with Spinoza’s work in Ethics, Naess 
agrees that insight is expressed through an action.  This is why value is conceived of as a 
transcendental notion – because to truly understand what intrinsic value is, and thus what 
has intrinsic value, we must have reached the point to know what is good and concrete.  
What is good and concrete is so in every situation.  The intelligible (earthly matters) is the 
spiritual when norms are internalized and one reaches toward self-realization. 
Taylor highlights the importance of defining the term ‘spirituality,’ especially in 
contrast with ‘religion.’  While the latter term is often associated with the theocratic side 
of institutionalized religion, or ‘organized religion’ (most often the Abrahamic 
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religions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam), spirituality is often understood to be a more 
open- ended idea and is frequently associated with nature and a person's connection to the 
earth.  However, as Taylor points out, unless a person considers a belief in a creator or 
divine being to be essential to the term ‘religion,’ most spirituality could in fact be 
considered religious.89  Taylor echoes Saler in cautioning us against holding too narrow a 
view of religion and what it actually means.  Saler proposes that we view religion instead 
as “a network of predicates, criss-crossing and overlapping in their applicability to 
phenomena that we variously deem better and less-good exemplifications of the category 
religion.”90   
Naess' philosophy was heavily influenced by Spinoza, who himself "articulated a 
sophisticated organicism, or monastic pantheism, that influenced generations of future 
religionists... for if every being and object is a manifestation of God or God's activity, 
then everything has value, which presents a fundamental challenge to the prevailing 
anthropocentrism."91  Spinoza contradicted the notion that nature-based religions were 
primitive or dangerous; instead, he offered a solution to the spiritual dis-ease of the West.  
Naess interpreted his works to describe a "harmonious future characterized by fulfilling 
relationships among the earth's diverse forms of life."92   
Arne Naess was a well-known Spinozist.  He points out that, indeed, many of 
those engaged in the ecological crisis would consider themselves Spinozists in spite of the 
fact that Spinoza did not write on the beauty of nature, nor did he make it evident that he 
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felt any particular connection to animals.  It is his kind of philosophy of life that so 
inspires deep ecology supporters, as he sets out certain ultimate premises and applies 
them to concrete situations.93  As opposed to Aristotle’s identification of the good life to 
be guided by eudaimonia, Naess’ interpretation of Spinoza tells us that if we are to realize 
eudaimonia, we must live our lives under the direction of reason.94  Spinoza’s works, 
Naess believes, can be an important source of inspiration in the quest for ecological 
equilibrium. 
While Naess recognizes that there are numerous interpretations of Spinoza's work, 
he offers his own.95  According to Naess' interpretation, Nature, as discussed by Spinoza, 
is perfect in and of itself.  He notes that "perfection can only mean completeness of some 
sort when applied in general, and not to specifically human achievement.  In the latter 
case it means reaching what has been consciously intended."96  The bifurcation of matter 
and spirit in relation to Nature or ecology is not supported in Spinoza's work; rather both 
are facets of reality and perfection characterizes both.  If perfection in human 
achievement means reaching what is consciously intended, self-realization is the 
fulfillment of that ultimate goal.   
Nature is not a utilitarian concept.  It exists independent of human thought and 
action, and therefore human morality is not a law of nature.  There is no good or evil 
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within nature, as these terms "must be defined in relation to beings for which something is 
good or evil, useful or detrimental."97 
 
Reaching for the Future (Where do we go from here?) 
Following in Bron Taylor’s footsteps, let us borrow the idea presented in Malcom 
Gladwell’s Tipping Point.  Gladwell suggests that social change is abrupt.  It is rapid, 
spreads like wildfire, “coming as if from nowhere and with unstoppable momentum.”98  
Gladwell begins his book with an excerpt about Hush Puppies, which did not become 
popular until the 1990s.  It seemed that out of nowhere, the American shoe brand became 
an overnight success after years of failing business; they were being worn in clubs, 
designers were wearing them and featuring the shoes in their spring collections.  At some 
point, though it is nearly impossible to pinpoint exactly when, there was a tipping point.  
This is a small example of an epidemic in action.  “Ideas and products and messages and 
[behaviours] spread just like viruses do.”99 
As we move into the future, we approach Naess’ and Lonergan’s notion of self-
realization.  This converted state, this informed and reasonable state of living in the 
world, leads to more responsible and informed decision-making.  As human beings 
collectively act reasonably and responsibly, intending and reaching toward self-
realization, there could very well be a tipping point.  Appropriate action will conceivable 
become a global pandemic.  To clarify, this converted state refers to a state of moral 
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conversion and is not a simple adoption of a new mode of thinking.  One would not 
"choose" to accept this method of thinking.  While indeed we must choose to act 
reasonably, responsibly, that is be good judges, once this point of conversion, or self-
realization, has been reached, there is simply no other way to act – or to be in this world.  
It is an experience associated with the definitive and decisive joining of the mind and 
spirit. 
In a discussion with Dr. Michael Shute, Lonergan expert and aficionado, he told 
me “all religions posit an intelligible ground.”  Transcendental normative method allows 
us to make sense of the world; if one can make sense of the world, one enters the realm of 
the spirit (not matter!).  Lonergan aptly wrote: 
As science develops, philosophy is impelled to migrate from the world of 
theory and to find its basis in the world of interiority...  [Science] gives up 
any claim to necessity and truth.  It settles for verifiable possibilities that 
offer an ever-better approximation to truth…  In this situation philosophy 
is left with the problems of truth and relativism [and] of what is meant by 
reality.”100 
Understanding truth, what is good and concrete, is the ultimate goal within ethical 
deliberation.  Lonergan describes the basic pattern of conscious and intentional operations 
of his method as dynamic, comparing it to a pattern of bodily movements to form a dance 
or a pattern of sounds to form a melody.  To intend self-realization is to live by the 
functioning of the pattern.  To live by the functioning of the pattern is to live beautifully.  
Only by living beautifully can one move from the question of “How did we get here?” 
into an answer to the question of “Where do we go from here?” 
100 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 259. 
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